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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, as assignee of 
TMC CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff! Appellant, 
vs. 
DRA W, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendant!Respondent. 
And 
KEVIN TAGGART, an Individual, CAMDEN 
COURT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
TIMBERLINE PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, AARON DEAN 
EDDINGTON, an Individual, CITIZENS 
COMMUNITY BANK and ALL OTHER 
PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING INTEREST 
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, 
Defendants. 
SUPREME COURT # 40335 
Bingham County Case No. 
CV -2009-1641 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
State ofldaho In and For the County of Bingham 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding 
Attorney for Appellant 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Manwaring Law Office, P.A. 
381 Shoup Ave., Ste. 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorney for Respondent 
J. Michael Whieler 
THOMSEN STEVENS 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred in disregarding positive testimony found in the affidavit of 
Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within Taylorview Development. 
Draw argues that the district court did not disregard the positive testimony of Robert 
Butler. Draw's argument is unsupported by the plain language ofthe district court's decision. 
On reconsideration, Intermountain presented a two-pronged analysis to support its 
position before the district court that it was entitled to foreclose its materialmen's lien against 
Draw's parcel. Integral to both prongs was a factual determination that Draw's parcel was part of 
Taylorview Development. 
First, Intermountain argued that Draw owned - not merely was a servient estate holder of 
- an easement on the private road that provided the access to all parcels within the Development. 
Intermountain cited Idaho law stating that an owner of real property, which has an easement 
interest in a road abutting that property, is subject to the claim of a materialmen's lien incurred 
for the improvement of that easement. 
Second, Intermountain argued that Shawn Allen as the developer fit within the statutory 
language of being a person in charge of an improvement and held to be the agent of the owner 
for purposes of the materialmen's lien statute. 
The transcript of the hearing on Intermountain's motion for reconsideration illustrates the 
exact factual and legal issues Intermountain presented to the district court. 
Mr. Manwaring: Then, of course, as he identifies with the deed from 
Timberline to Draw, LLC, Draw received this somewhat square portion of 
Taylorview Development that is identified as storage units. I think that shows on 
Exhibit A as well. 
The Court: Right. 
Mr. Manwaring: That is part of Taylorview Development. All of that is 
part ofTaylorview Development. *** As so for the summary judgment to 
come and say, "Well, you're not part of Taylorview Development, and really, 
you're just trying to collect" and so we get caught up in the agency argument, we 
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just missed on the points that Intermountain has, and that is we have a lien. And 
we think: that the Court needs to reconsider that. The facts now show that Draw, 
LLC's parcel is within Taylorview Development. 
*** And in this setting, Shawn Allen has this entire roadway paved. We're not 
talking about the parking lot, because that doesn't apply to Draw. But we are 
talking about this private road. 
*** The first way that's [materialmen's lien] allowed by Idaho statute is, if 
you are the agent in charge of the development - that's the language of the statue. 
There's two ways under the statute to get a lien. 
*** But in this case, you've got both aspects of the materialmen's lien statute 
that apply here, because Taylorview Development was being developed by Shawn 
Allen. And his affidavit says, "We went in and paved this private road, and that 
private road is the access road for all of the parties who own parcels on that 
property. " 
*** ... the second prong of the materialmen's lien. 
And that is, if you are the agent in charge of development and you prepare 
this development and someone buys a lot in your development, they are subject to 
whatever lien claim you have because of the work you have performed that 
benefits the property. 
(Transcript on Motion/or Reconsideration, pp. 12-14) 
Both prongs of Intermountain's legal arguments supporting its lien rights rest on a factual 
determination of whether Draw's parcel is within Taylorview Development. If Draw's parcel is 
part of Taylorview Development, then its easement through the Development was improved and 
under 45-501, Shawn Allen was agent for Draw in making that improvement. 
That portion of the district court's decision cited by Draw in its Respondent's Brief does 
not counter Intermountain's position. In fact, Draw concedes the district court determined there 
was a fact issue as to whether or not Draw's parcel lies within Taylorview Development. 
More germane to the issue on appeal are the following determinations set forth in the 
district court's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
In addition, the record does not reflect that Draw's Property lies within the 
Taylorview Development. Draw has an easement over the roadway that lies 
within the Taylorview Development, but the evidence in the record does not 
support a finding that Draw's Property lies within the Taylorview Development. 
(Clerk's Record, pp. 239-240). 
***Thus, based upon the evidence in the record, at best, a fact issue remains 
whether or not Draw's Property lies within the Taylorview Development. 
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Assuming, however, that Draw's Property does lie within the Taylorview 
Development, the record does not support a finding that Draw, as an owner on 
one of the Taylorview parcels, consented to the paving or authorized the paving 
through Taggart as Draw's alleged agent. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 240). 
Unquestionably, the district court ignored the positive testimony of Robert Butler in 
reaching its decision that Draw's parcel was not within Taylorview Development. Further, the 
district court acknowledged a fact issue existed as to whether Draw's parcel is within Taylorview 
Development, an issue it created on its own. 
Notwithstanding its disregard of Butler's testimony and its own acknowledgement of an 
issue of fact, the district court went on to discuss general agency issues and not the two-pronged 
analyses advanced by Intermountain. Instead the district court, and Draw on appeal, drifted from 
the direct issue and diverged into an unrelated examination of whether Allen or Taggart or 
anyone was Draw's agent. Had the district court made that factual finding as required by the 
record before it on summary judgment, it could have avoided the needless discussion on general 
agency principles. 
Upon the required liberal construction of § 45-501 in favor of materialmen, the answer is 
plainly stated: Allen or Taggart "shall be agents of the owner." BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 
144 Idaho 890, 893-94, 174 P.3d 399, 402-03 (2007). 
Therefore, the district court's error in disregarding positive testimony proving Draw's 
parcel was part of Taylorview Development is the critical issue on appeal. If the district court's 
findings that the "black lines" are the boundary of the Development cannot be supported by 
facts, then its decision must be vacated and remanded for further determination of the factual 
issue. 
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As noted in the Appellant's Brief, there are no facts supporting the district court's finding 
that black lines on an assessor's plat or any other plat are the boundaries of Taylorview 
Development. Just the opposite is true. Butler affirmatively testified that Draw's parcel is part of 
Taylorview Development. Butler's testimony proves Draw's parcel consists of a specific lot on 
the record of survey together with an undivided easement in a private road providing access 
through the Development. The district court erred in disregarding that positive testimony. 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625, 603 P.2d 575,582 (1979). 
Draw attempts to bolster the district court's decision through a strained reading of § 45-
501. Draw emphasizes the words "at the instance of the owner" found in the statute and then 
wanders off track. Draw maintains that neither Allen nor Taggart "had ownership interest or 
authority over Draw's unimproved property at the time of the paving. Therefore, Allen's 
testimony could not establish 'that the private drive was paved at [Allen's] or Taggart's direction 
as the developer and owner of the property' or that Allen and Taggart were 'person['s] having 
charge' of Draw's property." (Respondent's Brief, p. 9). 
That is not the language of the statute. Nor does it correctly set forth Intermountain's 
position. 
Draw's parcel was and is part of Taylorview Development. As such, there is no 
requirement under the statute that Allen or Taggart have ownership interest in Draw's parcel or 
in fact be the express agent of Draw. Simply put, § 45-501 deems a person having charge of an 
improvement "shall be held to be the agent of the owner. ... " As developers of Taylorview 
Development Allen and Taggart made improvements to the private road. Through that 
improvement, either of them may be held to be the agent of Draw for purposes of the 
materialmen's lien statute. 
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Secondarily, by failing to find Draw's parcel lies within Taylorview Development, the 
district court erroneously disregarded Intermountain's contention that improvement to Draw's 
easement gives no basis in law for enforcement of a materialmen's lien. 
Not only was Draw's parcel located within Taylorview Development, but also Draw by 
deed was granted an easement interest in the private road. That private road was Draw's access 
to the public street. 
Draw challenges Intermountain's issue regarding improvement to the easement. 
Specifically, Draw notes portions of the district court's order addressing the easement issue. 
Dispassionate review of the district court's analysis on the easement question manifests the court 
was awash in misunderstanding Draw's easement. For example, the district court observed: 
Even if Draw has an easement over Taylorview's driveway, which is not 
established in the record, Intermountain points to no law which would require a 
dominate estate owner's payment, save for an express agreement, for the cost of 
the servient estate owner's easement improvements. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 193) 
Obviously, the district court again disregarded the positive testimony of Butler 
establishing Draw's parcel was part of Taylorview Development and the court ignored the plain 
language in Draw's deed attached to Butler's affidavit. Draw's deed conveyed fee simple title to 
the unimproved parcel "Together with and excepting therefrom an easement 24 feet in width, 
lying 12 feet on both sides of the following described line: ... " (Clerk's Record, p. 227). 
Consequently, Draw has both a dominant and servient estate. Draw's parcel is the 
servient estate to the dominant easement interest of all other owners of property within 
Taylorview Development. See generally Akers v. D.L. White Canst., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 301, 
127 P.3d 204,204 (2005). 
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Yet, Draw is the dominant estate regarding its easement along the private drive crossing 
the property of all other owners within Taylorview Development. Butler's affidavit proved those 
facts. Indeed, the private drive through Taylorview Development is Draw's access. Thus, Draw 
as the dominant estate enjoys the benefits of all improvements made to the private drive and 
under the district court's analysis has no obligation to pay for such improvements. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Draw. 
Where the record on appeal demonstrates that the district court did not correctly find the 
facts leading to proper application of § 45-501 or the easement prong, remand is necessary. See 
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Waiver 
Draw adds an additional issue in its Respondent's Brief asserting Intermountain waived 
its right to argue the district court "failed to apply the clear language of § 45-50 I." 
Draw's position misses the thrusts of Intermountain's argument. Draw's contention that 
Intermountain waived the issue of the district court erring in applying § 45-501 begs the 
question: If the district court's findings of fact support its conclusion that Draw's parcel is not 
within Taylorview Development, then what's the issue? 
Nevertheless and contrary to Draw's assertion, Intermountain has not waived any issue 
on appeal. 
Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R., provides that an appellant's failure to include in his initial 
appellate brief a fair statement of an issue presented for review results in waiver 
of the issue. However, we have stated this rule will be relaxed when the issue is 
supported by argument in the briefs. State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111,952 P.2d 
1245, 1247 (1998). Our statement in Crowe should have included the 
qualification that the issue must be addressed in the appellant's opening brief. 
Rule 35(a)(6), I.A.R., requires that the opening brief "contain the contentions of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon." Thus, we have repeatedly stated that we will not consider an issue 
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not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Although an 
appellant may file a reply brief, the reply brief may only present additional 
argument in rebuttal to contentions advanced in the respondent's brief. I.A.R. 
35(c). 
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525,272 P.3d 491, 497 (2012). 
In its opening brief, Intermountain presented argument with citations of authority and 
references to transcripts and records on appeal, the question of whether the district court properly 
applied § 45-501. 
Thus, Intermountain has not waived any issue pressed with support in its opening brief. 
B. The District Court erred as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its attorney fees 
under I.C. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial transaction between TMC and Draw. 
Draw argues the district court correctly determined there was a commercial transaction 
between TMC, or its assignee Intermountain, and Draw to support an award of attorney fees 
under § 12-120(3). Both the district court and Draw misconstrue application of that section. 
Under Draw's argument, § 12-120(3) applies in a vacuum: any allegation of a 
commercial transaction not only triggers, but also mandates, an award of fees. Nothing in 
Idaho's case law supports that theory. Regardless of whether a party alleges a commercial 
transaction, the law requires that in fact a commercial transaction between parties is established 
in order to apply § 12-120(3). 
Draw relies upon language it cites from Garner v. Pavey, 151 Idaho 462, 470, 259 P.3d 
608,616 (2011). However, Garner does not bestow fees as Draw asserts. 
Great Plains thus attempted to clarify that a mere request for attorney fees 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), without more, is not sufficient to trigger the 
commercial transaction prong of that section. In other words, neither a claim or 
request in the prayer of a complaint for fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), nor a request 
or claim for attorney fees in a memorandum of costs and fees, is sufficient to 
trigger application of that fee provision. A party seeking fees based an a mere 
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request under Ie. § 12-120(3) must show that a commercial transaction was the 
gravamen of the action before a court may award fees. However, allegations in 
the complaint that the parties entered into a commercial transaction and that the 
complaining party is entitled to recover based upon that transaction, are 
sufficient to trigger the application of Ie. § 12-120(3). 
It is true that a fee award was denied to Northwest Pipeline (NWP), the prevailing 
party in Great Plains, even though the losing party, Cate-Idaho, had claimed it 
was entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) with regard to an unjust 
enrichment claim, upon which it subsequently failed to recover. 136 Idaho at 472, 
36 P.3d at 224 ("In this case, attorney fees were requested for the separate claim 
of unjust enrichment pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3), and the gravamen of that claim 
was a commercial transaction."). However, the Court held that attorney fees were 
not available under that statute because "[tJhere was no transaction between the 
subcontractors and NWP. " 
1d. (Emphasis added). 
Because there was no commercial transaction between those two parties, the 
Fergusons cannot rely on the commercial transaction prong ofl.C. § 12-120(3) to 
claim fees. See Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735 
(2011) (fees are available under the commercial transaction prong of Ie. § 12-
120(3) "so long as a commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing 
party and the party from whom that party seeks fees. "). . 
Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 778,264 P.3d 400, 417 
(2011)(emphasis added). 
Recent pronouncements from the Idaho Supreme Court give further clarification to the 
question of awards of attorney fees in commercial transactions. "We today make clear that, in 
order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the transaction 
for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 744, 274 P.3d 1256, 
1269 (2012). "Reynolds retained Trout Jones for the purpose of facilitating the purchase of real 
property for commercial purposes. Trout Jones entered into the relationship for commercial, not 
altruistic, purposes. Therefore, this transaction had the 'symmetry of commercial purpose 
necessary to trigger I.C. § 12-120(3).'" Reynolds v. Trout Jones, Idaho Supreme Court 2013 Slip 
Opinion No.7 (January 23, 2013)(emphasis added), citing Carillo, supra. 
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There was no commercial transaction between TMC and Draw. Draw certainly did not 
enter into any relationship for commercial purposes with TMe. The facts unmistakably show no 
transaction, commercial or otherwise, occurred between TMC and Draw. 
The district court erred in awarding to Draw some of attorney fees. 
e. Intermountain is entitled to an award of costs on appeal. 
Draw correctly points out a mistake in Intermountain's opening brief where citation to 
incorrect rules were made for an award of costs on appeal. 
Intermountain mistakenly cited I.A.R. 41 and 35(b)(5) as the basis for an award of costs 
on appeal. The correct rule is I.A.R. 40. 
Accordingly, Intermountain seeks an award of its costs on appeal as provided in I.A.R. 
40(a). Intermountain is not seeking an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
D. Draw is not entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
In accordance with I.e. § 12-120(3), Draw seeks an award of its costs and attorney fees 
on appeal. 
As already discussed in the preceding issue involving the award of fees by the district 
court, Draw was not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under § 12-120(3). The same 
analysis applies on appeal. Draw did not enter into any commercial transaction with TMC or 
Intermountain for purposes of awarding attorney fees on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court's order denying Intermountain's motion to reconsider and its previously 
entered Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment should be vacated together 
with the subsequent certified Final Judgment and amended judgment awarding fees. 
The case should be remanded to the district court. 
Intermountain has not waived any issues on appeal. 
Intermountain is entitled to an award of its costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal. 
Draw is not entitled to an award of its costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
Dated this 3L!7 day of January 2013. 
Kipp . Manwaring 
Attorney for Appellant 
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